The heart of transfer pricing tested for the first time in SA courts

Picture: Engin Akyurt (Unsplash)

The complexity of transfer pricing disputes has rarely been tested in South Africa. However, a recent case centred on the application of the arm’s length principle, which is at the heart of transfer pricing.

ABD Limited, a South African multinational company, won its appeal in the Tax Court against an additional assessment of around R1.2 billion. The assessment has been set aside. Sars is appealing the judgment.

The assessment followed an audit of ABD’s transfer pricing methodology by the South African Revenue Service (Sars). Experts believe this precedent-setting case provides a glimpse into how courts may approach transfer pricing cases in future.

It suggests a preference for “established and recognised” methods as opposed to “novel and untested approaches” to transfer pricing disputes, says Pieter van der Zwan, independent tax advisor and accounting specialist, in his analysis of the case.

The dispute stems from an audit conducted in 2014 relating to the royalty rate ABD charged its operating companies in different jurisdictions for the use of its intellectual property (its brand) during the period 2009 to 2012.

ABD charged all of them the same royalty rate of 1%. The audit resulted in an additional assessment of R7.5 billion, which was reduced to R1.2 billion by the time the case went to court around 2021.

Different methodologies

Experts used different methodologies, in line with the guidelines of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in performing the calculations to arrive at the appropriate rate.

The royalty must be at arm’s length – what it would be if it were between two independent enterprises, as opposed to a company taxed in one jurisdiction and its subsidiary taxed in another.

Sars contended that the 1% was not an arm’s length royalty. It has the power to adjust the rate if it believes the price does not reflect an arm’s length transaction. Sars based its initial additional assessment on the report of a Dr David, who used the Transactional Profit Split Method (TPSM).

Daniel Erasmus, lead attorney in the ABD case, said Sars and ABD had been arguing from the same page for seven years.

“One month before the trial Sars booted their expert witnesses and brought in an entirely new expert with an entirely new methodology driven by the willingness to pay method.”

The new expert, a Dr Slate, proposed higher, variable royalty rates based on a “willingness to pay” survey. According to the judgment, the fluctuations created by adopting this approach were considerable – ranging from 1% to 9.2%.

No incentive to shift profits 

Multinational companies use transfer pricing to allocate profits.

The Corporate Finance Institute explains that “effective but legal transfer pricing” takes advantage of different tax regimes in different countries by raising transfer prices for goods and services produced in countries with lower tax rates.

ABD argued that it had no incentive to charge its subsidiaries a lower royalty to avoid paying higher taxes in SA.

The tax rates in the jurisdictions where the subsidiaries operated were equal to or higher than the SA tax rate.

Sars and ABD used different methodologies to support their approaches. Sars relied on the TPSM, and ABD relied on both the TPSM and the Comparable Uncontrolled Price (Cup) method. The latter method, when available, is the preferred method of the OECD.

Judge Norman Manoim considered the case in terms of the arguments based on the Cup method.

Criticism against approaches

According to the judgment, the “most significant critique” of Slate’s (Sars’s expert witness) valuation was a legal one, but it had profound implications for his survey on which it is contingent.

Slate assumed that the licensed rights included goodwill.

“This error then had implications for the survey questions on which the willingness to pay calculations were based. Questions in the survey were based on the goodwill of the ABD brand,” Manoim said.

A further criticism of its reliability is that the survey was performed in 2020. Yet respondents had to indicate what they might have done in the period 2009-2012.

Four of every 10 of the respondents would have been teenagers a decade before. Some may not have been old enough to have a phone in that period let alone pay for it.

ABD used a transaction that resembled the preferred Cup method, and while there were criticisms of its application, they were not conclusive, Manoim concluded.

However, the criticism of Slate’s approach had a solid factual basis. “Its assumptions, legal, economic, and accounting have been dismantled. If this were not enough it is an untested methodology for use in litigation in transfer pricing cases.”

Extensive resources

Manoim said he appreciated that the outcome of the case would be a disappointment to Sars as it had put extensive resources into it to create a precedent in a seldom-litigated field of tax law.

Sars not only fought a case that ran contrary to the opinions and approach of its initial expert, but “there appeared to be no rationale for ABD to have any motive to short-change the South African fiscus,” Manoim concluded.

ABD attorney Erasmus warned that Sars will challenge taxpayers on their research and surveys used to support the methodology they rely on. “You must have the information at your fingertips.”

Source: Article by Amanda Visser for Moneyweb online, 26 September 2024

Transfer Pricing – the culprit in base erosion and profit shifting

transfer pricing

Tax collection from transfer pricing audits has become more common in Africa, with little sign that it will abate in the near future.

The transfer pricing policies of many multinational companies have attracted widespread attention in the recent past, to the extent that it is considered the “criminal child of tax”.

Transfer pricing is the way a company prices goods and services supplied to a company within the same group. The price should be aligned to a price that the company would offer to a third party.

Nishana Gosai, senior transfer pricing executive at Baker McKenzie, and former head of the transfer pricing unit at the South African Revenue Service (SARS), says that despite having transfer policies in place, most large multinational companies find it difficult to control every aspect of its business. There is a rising perception that transfer-pricing transgressions are criminal and should be met with criminal sanction.

In Tanzania, failure to keep transfer pricing documentation is considered an offence. The punishment is a fine of $30,000 or six months’ imprisonment, or both.

In SA, the revenue authority settled a transfer-pricing dispute with a subsidiary of Kumba Iron Ore to the tune of R2.5bn in 2016. The initial assessment was R6.5bn.

In Tanzania, a large mining company recently received a $190bn tax assessment.

Transfer pricing has been regarded as the major culprit in base erosion and profit shifting (Beps) in which profits are shifted from high-tax jurisdictions to lower tax jurisdictions to limit a global group’s tax exposure.

Gosai emphasises that transfer pricing is not an exact science. It requires judgment and discretion. No one can define the exact price. Finding middle ground requires pragmatism. Information is important in any transfer-pricing dispute, but it seems the burden of proof is becoming insurmountable, she says.

“We are moving into a space where tax administrations are demanding documented proof and evidence to substantiate routine commercial realities,” Gosai says.

Andrew Wellsted, head of the tax team at Norton Rose Fulbright, says that if a company’s affairs or record-keeping are not up to scratch, it faces a long, time-consuming process of getting what the revenue authorities require.

If taxpayers have followed incorrect practices, knowingly or otherwise, it will expose them to tax liabilities and potential disputes. Irrespective of any actual legislative changes, 93% of respondents believe that tax authorities will increase tax audit assessments as a result of proposed Beps initiatives.

“If the audit is conducted in an aggressive fashion, it can be very disruptive to the day-to-day operations of the taxpayer. This needs to be carefully managed by taxpayers and the authorities,” says Wellsted.

Deloitte recently published its survey on the views of multinational companies regarding the greater interest in “responsible tax” and Beps among the media, and political and activist groups.

In the 2017 survey, 460 people in 38 countries responded. The results show that respondents are expecting a major effect on their compliance requirements due to the additional reporting requirements arising from the Beps action plans developed and published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

The survey shows that 94% of the respondents believe that the additional transfer-pricing reporting requirements will substantially increase their compliance burden when it comes to corporate tax.

More than 90% of the respondents agree that tax structures are under greater scrutiny by tax administrations than a year ago.

“Irrespective of any actual legislative changes, 93% of respondents believe that tax authorities will increase tax audit assessments as a result of proposed Beps initiatives,” Deloitte’s survey found.

Gosai says many multinationals make the mistake of not fully understanding what they are submitting to a revenue authority, the context of such submissions, the potential ways that it could be interpreted by a revenue official and, most importantly, that once submitted, such disclosures cannot be retracted.

Companies tend to over-comply when faced with a request for information from SARS, especially if it is not specific about its scope. There is a danger that information offered by the taxpayer that is not relevant to the question asked may lead to further questions or may create the wrong impression.

Most tax disputes turn either on a legal interpretation of legislation, or a factual issue. The dispute is often centred on whether or not an arm’s-length price (the price offered to an unconnected third party) has been charged.

“This involves complex and detailed economic analysis and is invariably very subjective,” Wellsted says.

“Thus finding the objectively right answer as to what an arm’s-length price could be, is almost impossible,” he says.

Source: Originally published in Business Day, Visser. A, published as “Multinationals face quandary over transfer pricing”, September 6, 2017.