It is important to consider that ‘modernisation’ is not just a facet or trait of the African continent. Through my experience and involvement in other modernisation programmes, it is quite clear that the pre and post 9/11 world of customs administrations has in fact laid most, if not all customs administrations on a platform or cause for much introspection and rebuilding.

The collapse of the Berlin Wall in the 1980’s brought about a significant change beyond the political domain in the so-called dismantling of the Communist Block. Many of the former ‘iron curtain’ countries had little or no internal structures to deal with the impending establishment and rebuilding of their individual economies – in a modern commercial world. From a customs point of view, few in fact had a ‘Customs’ department. The West European countries had a significant advantage over their eastern counterparts from a trade and technological point of view. The burgeoning European Union (EU) had little choice but to assist in their eastern neighbour’s development. Donor aid through international assistance packages saw the proliferation of ‘customs programmes’ – providing both ‘consultants’ and ‘consulting houses’ significant opportunity to rake in huge profits in developing or modernising a host country’s customs administration. At this time there was very little by way of choice in terms of automated systems. A country either accepted the UN’s ‘free’ ASYCUDA system, or if its government had favourable ties with the French, then the alternative was the SOFIX system. Microsoft and others were too busy developing operating systems and desktop software at the time. Besides, the well-to-do developed countries were all too busy pushing ASYCUDA on unsuspecting ‘developing’ countries, and little thought was ever given to customs software development on a commercial level. At that time UK and US Customs were so involved in securing assistance programmes under the ASYCUDA banner and were exceedingly opposed the French offering, which had proven very successful in the French-speaking territories. It was a well-known fact at the time that neither of the aforementioned administrations thought ASYCUDA a viable option for their own countries.

It is therefore easy to understand why UNCTAD can stake claim to over 80 installations worldwide, of its various ASYCUDA software versions. Many of these countries have benefitted little through the painful experiences of ‘freeware’ installation. The experience normally consisted in ‘European’ customs influences being forced on the target country with little option of ‘customisation’ to the state’s needs. Hordes of consultants would ‘construct’ a customs administration around the software product. Customs technique would take the form of crash courses on the ASYCUDA application and the HS Nomenclature. The donor aid ‘buddy system’ also ensured that Pre-Shipment Inspection (PSI) agencies (in many cases the same consulting houses) were awarded lucrative contracts to inspect all consignments being exported from the developing ‘third world’ state to ‘first world’ countries. The reason: these states had no experience on tariff classification and customs valuation. In reality, this was never going to form part of the donor aid. After all, why train a nation when so much money can be made from outsourcing the operation of key customs functions. Once again, is it not surprising that the poorer countries seek to rid themselves of domination by global outsiders. This practice continues even today, where many a contract for the implementation of non-intrusive inspectional (NII) equipment – X-Ray and Gamma Ray scanners – is awarded to the same PSI culprits who, in turn, hold a nation’s traders to ransom through onerous scanning fees. The host nation is dangled a carrot in not having to foot the bill for any NII infrastructure, while the concessionaire recoups all capital costs, and more, through the aforementioned screening fees – all in the name of supply chain security! Fortunately, African states are beginning to avoid these deals.

Over the last 10 years, new developments in ‘customs’ software has seen a numerous array of software houses developing customs, port community and supply chain computerised solutions. To avoid polarisation some of these vendors have been forward-thinking in modelling their solutions on standards as established by the World Customs Organisation (WCO). At the same time, so-called developing countries are also questioning more profoundly the credibility of companies and consultancies in the customs space. External supply chain operators and software vendors supporting the trade and industry are likewise concerned with the level of sophistication and ease of implementation of these products.

My experience over the last 15 years bears little support for the so-called management consultants who act as ‘change agents’. This is a space which the host nation must control at all costs; otherwise there will be nothing but disaster. My home country, South Africa, is one such place that has taken a key decision not to consider implementation of a software solution, supported by a 3rd party vendor. Likewise, the onerous and often dangerous involvement of too many management consultants is also being kept in check.

The developments unravelling in the SARS Customs modernisation programme will in my view provide a world-class case study for any nation aspiring to a modernisation of such magnitude. All the key criteria are in place to enable this success: government funding and buy-in, management support and sponsorship, and external stakeholder involvement.

Watch my blog for more customs modernisation developments, soon.